
Technical description:
Title: Cryptonomicon.
Author: Neal Stephenson.
Publisher: Arrow Books.
Edition: First edition, reimpressed, London (UK), 2007 (1999).
Pages: 918 pages.
ISBN: 0-09-941067-2
Find it on Amazon (USA, UK).
— Anoche mi padre me contó que se ha vuelto a casar con... otra mujer que yo no conozco... y tiene hijos con ella. Dos niñas y un niño.
— ¿Y esos también están en los hogares?
— No, esos no. Esos viven con mi padre y la mujer de mi padre en nuestra casa de Madrid. Mira, mejor... así cuando mi padre me saque tendré con quién jugar.
(Giménez: pp. 490-491)
— ¡Qué bien lo estamos pasando! ¿Eh, Hormiga?
— ¡Fenómeno! Pablito... ¿tú tienes padre?
— No, sólo madre.
— ¿Tu madre, cuando entra en una tienda, dice "Arriba España"?
— No sé. Mi madre no entra en ninguna tienda. Está enferma en un sanatorio.
— Es que mi padre, cuando entra en algún sitio, dice "¡Arriba España!" Todo el mundo dice "buenos días" y él "¡Arriba España!"... y lo dice como gritando. ¡Y me da una vergüenza...!
— Lo hará para llamar la atención, para hacerse el chulito...
— ¡Eso es lo que me da vergüenza! A veces le contestan mal. Cuando fuimos a hacernos la foto, había un señor en la tienda que le dijo: "¡menos gritos, milagritos!"
— ¡Ja, ja, ja...! "¡Menos gritos, milagritos!" ¡Qué risa...!
(Giménez: pp. 582-583)
The key is to recognize that it is legitimate for Republicans to worry about the elderly, education, and the environment. It is okay for Democrats to work to solve crime and welfare and to hold down taxes. Issues are not the preserve of one party or the other. Candidates, to be effective, need to cross over and show their ability to solve the other side's problems.
Bill Clinton proved this to be so. But the Republicans have yet to realize they can use their basic issues of less taxation and government regulation to win elections only if they offer credible programs for education, the environment, the elderly, and economic growth. But as long as Republicans offer no real alternatives on these Democratic issues, voters will continue to reject them. Voters will not seek low taxes and limited government at the price of jettisoning their concerns over the Democratic issues.
In addressing the other party's issues, a "me too" campaign never works. To be successful, a candidate cannot jusst mimic his opponent's rhetoric or programs; rather, he has to invent a new range of solutions to the problems historically associated with the other party. In the 1996 campaign, Clinton did not merely parrot Republican proposals, he sought to defuse the pressure for GOP programs by using Democratic means to achieve Republican goals.
(Morris: pp. 51-52).
Scandal sells newspapers, radio programs, and TV shows. It just doesn't move voters. It attracts those who are already decided politically —base voters of either party— to the TV set, but it does little to influence the real playing ground of our politics: the independent middle.
(Morris: p. 45)
One of the reasons politicians like Clinton have proven less vulnerable than one might expect to constant attacks on their characters, is that voters don't want to have to trust a candidate to make decisions for them. They want their elected officials on a shorter leash. Voters now insist that a candidate spell out his program, his vision, his ideas, and then they will elect him to fulfill that specific mandate. As Tina Turner sang, "What's love got to do with it?"
(Morris: pp. 32-33)
If American politicians were truly pragmatic and did what was really in their own best self-interest our political process would be a lot more clean, positive, nonpartisan, and issue-oriented. It is not practicality which drives the partisanship, and the never-ending cycle of investigation and recrimination in which we wallow, but a complete misapprehension of what Americans want and what politicians —in their own career self-interest— should offer. If Machiavelli were alive today, he would counsel idealism as the most pragmatic course.
(Morris: p. XV)
The western empire was scarcely a memory now. The last Latin emperor had fallen just a few years after Patrick died. And though there was still a Greek emperor in the east at Constantinople, where a small, defensible state was long established on the Bosporus, he might as well have been at Timbuktu for all his law was known in western lands. All the great continental libraries had vanished; even memory of them had been erased from the minds of those who lived in the emerging feudal societies of medieval Europe.
(Cahill: p. 181)
Ireland, at peace and furiosuly copying, thus stood in the position of becoming Europe's publisher. But the pagan Saxon settlements of southern England had cut Ireland off from easy commerce with the continent. While Rome and its ancient empire faded from memory and a new, iliterate Europe rose on its ruins, a vibrant, literary culture was blooming in secret along its Celtic fringe. It needed only one step more to close the circle, which would reconnect Europe to its own past by way of scribal Ireland. (...) Columcille provided that step.
(Cahill: p. 183)
To Roman citizens, the place to be was a Roman city or villa. The pagus, the uncultivated countryside, inevitably suggested discomfort and hardship. The inhabitants of the pagus —pagani, or pagans— were country bumpkins, rustic, unrealiable, threatening. Roman Christians assumed this prejudice without examing it.
(Cahill: p. 107)
If we page quickly through world literature from its beginnings to the advent of Augustine, we realize that with Augustine human consciousness takes a quantum leap forward —and becomes self-consciousness. Here for the first time is a man consistently observing himself not as Man but as this singular man —Augustine. From this point on, true autobiography becomes possible, and so does its near relative, subjective and autobiographical fiction.
(Cahill: p. 41)
For all the splendor of Roman standard, the power of Roman boot, and the extent of Roman road, the entire empire hugs the Mediterranean like a child's village of sand, waiting to be swept into the sea. From fruitful Gaul and Britain in the north to the fertile Nile Valley in the south, from the ricky Iberian shore in the west to the parched coasts of Asia Minor, all provinces of the empire turn toward the great sea, toward Medi-Terra-nea —the Sea of Middle Earth. And as they turn to the center of their world, they turn back on all that lies behind them, beyond the Roman wall. They turn their back on the barbarians.
(Cahill: p. 12)
The word Irish is seldom coupled with the word civilization. (...) And yet... Ireland, a little island at the edge of Europe that has known neither Renaissance nor Enlightenment —in some ways, a Third World country with, as John Betjeman claimed, a Stone Age culture— had one moment of unblemished glory. For, as the Roman Empire fell, as all through Europe matted, unwashed barbarians descended on the Roman cities, looting artifacts and burning books, the Irish, who were just learning to read and write, took up the great labor of copying all of western literature -everything they could lay their hands on. These scribes then served as conduits through which the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian cultures were transmitted to the tribed of Europe, newly settled amid the rubble and ruined vineyards of the civilization they had overwhelmed. Without this Service of the Scribes, everything that happened subsequently would have been unthinkable. Without the Mission of the Irish Monks, who single-handedly refounded European civilization throughout the continent in the bays and valleys of their exile, the world that came after them would have been an entirely different one —a world without books. And our own world would never have come to be.
(Thomas Cahill: pp. 3-4)
En el resto de los apartados programáticos UCD no se distanciaba sensiblemente de lo que ya comenzaba a considerarse normal. Una política interior basada en la defensa de la economía social de mercado, con incidencia del Estado en los sectores monopolistas y en "aquellos en los que se produzca una excesiva concentración de capital"; una política exterior de relaciones políticas plenas con todos los países y con el designio de conseguir la recuperación de la soberanía sobre Gibraltar y la integración en el Mercado Común, y una política social en libertad sindical, con jornada semanal de cuarenta horas, igualdad de derechos para el hombre y la mujer y planificación familiar asistida por la Seguridad Social.
(Chamorro: pp. 173-174)
Hay posiciones que es conveniente mantener cuando se mantienen y que, luego, hay que cederlas —meses más tarde— cuando el compromiso político lo requiere. Toda negociación entraña una búsqueda de aproximaciones, a la vista de las posiciones de los negociadores. Pero los negociadores no suelen ser plenipotenciarios, sino que negocian en calidad de representantes de unos colectivos a los que han de dar explicaciones y tiempo para incorporar los distintos elementos y términos de cada paso de la negociación.
(Chamorro: p. 109)
Sería muy difícil modificar los comportamientos de las instituciones públicas si no hay una profunda reforma de la Administración pública, y resulta difícil pensar que ésta se pueda hacer a corto plazo, ya sea por UCD o por cualquier otro partido. Y es difícil porque basta examinar la estructura y composición del Consejo de Ministros para darse cuenta de que si ésos tienen que reformar la Administración, la Administración va a tardar en ser reformada. Pero es que si esa reforma tiene que ser hecha por un partido como el PSOE, que teóricamente tiene voluntad reformista en ese sentido, nos encontramos con esa gran masa de funcionarios medios seguidores del PSOE, que se opondrán con rigor, y la reforma, igualmente, irá para largo.
(Chamorro: pp. 82-83)
La fórmula UCD, que estoy tratando de analizar, sólo se explica como sugerencia de un terreno de juego en el que, a tenor de los conflictos internos, lo único que se puede ofrecer al exterior del partido, como oferta electoral y como proyecto político de sociedad, es un emblema de moderación.
(Chamorro: p. 76)
Por lo que respecta al primer punto, a la articulación consensual hacia el exterior, UCD es un partido de engarce ideológico entre socialdemócratas, liberales y democristianos que se articularon como mejor fórmula de desenvolvimiento frente a la derecha tradicionaly franquista, por un lado, y la izquierda clásica, por el otro. Ese engarce ideológico se vio favorecido con la decisión mayoritaria -aunque relativa en términos parlamentarios- de voto de un electorado que si por algo estaba era por la normalización y por el deseo de que no se repitiera el viejo rictus histórico en el que las cosas se salieran de quicio y llegaran a más.
(Chamorro: p. 225)
Los momentos de la transición en que con mayor encono se enfrentaron los partidarios de la reforma con los de la ruptura se habían visto jalonados por los gritos en la calle de "Libertad, amnistía y estatuto de autonomía". Lo de libertad y amnistía estuvo siempre muy claro para los gobernantes y para los gobernados, para los políticos y para el electorado. Pero no así lo del estatuto de autonomía.
(Chamorro: p. 42)
The central idea of the consilience world view is that all tangible phenomena, from the birth of stars to the workings of social institutions, are based on material processes that are ultimately reducible, however long and tortuous the sequences, to the laws of physics. In support of this idea is the conclusion of biologists that humanity is kin to all other life forms by common descent.
(Edward O. Wilson: p. 266)
Thanks to science and technology, access to factual knowledge of all kinds is rising exponentially while dropping in unit cost. It is destined to become global and democratic. Soon it will be available everywhere on television and computer screens. What then? The answer is clear: synthesis. We are drowning in information, while starving for wisdom. The world henceforth will be run by synthesizers, people able to put together the right information at the right time, think critically about it, and make important choices wisely.
(Edward O. Wilson: p. 269)
There is only one way to unite the great branches of learning and end the culture wars. It is to view the boundary between the scientific and literary cultures not as a territorial line but as a broad and mostly unexplored terrain awaiting cooperative entry form both sides. (...) The two cultures share the following challenge. We know that virtually all of human behavior is transmitted by culture. We also know that biology has an important effect on the origin of culture and its transmission. The question remaining is how biology and culture interact, and in particular how they interact across all societies to create the commonalities of human nature.
(Edward O. Wilson: p. 126)
The most interesting feature of chaos in populations is that it can be produced by exactly defined properties of real organisms. Contrary to previous belief, chaotic patterns are not necessarily the product of randomly acting forces of the environment that rock the population up and down. In this case and in many other complex physical phenomena, chaos theory provides an authentically deep principle of nature. It says that extremely complicated, outwardly indecipherable patterns can be determined by small, measurable changes within the system.
But, again, which systems, which changes? That is the nub of the problem. None of the elements of complexity theory has anything like the generality and the fidelity to factual detail we wish from theory. None has triggered an equivalent cascade of theoretical innovations and practical applications. What does complexity theory need to be successful in biology?
(Edward O. Wilson: p. 90)
Between the first and thirteenth centuries they led Europe by a wide margin. But according to Joseph Needham, the principal Western chronicler of Chinese scientific endeavors, their focus stayed on holistic properties and on the harmonious, hierarchical relationships of entities, from stars down to mountains and flowers and sand. In this world view the entities of Nature are inseparable and perpetually changing, not discrete and constant as perceived by the Enlightenment thinkers. As a result the Chinese never hit upon the entry point of abstraction and break-apart analytic research attained by European science in the seventeenth century.You see, multiculturalists take the typically postmodern approach that everything is relative. Therefore, there is no way to judge anything. Actually, there may not even be any anything to judge, since there is no evidence whatsoever that there is a world outside our own minds in the first place. It's relativism taken to its highest form. Yet, what Wilson is telling us here is that there is indeed a way to judge. There is a yardstick that we can use to measure things against. In the case of knowledge, it consists of the extent to which a particular theory manages to explain events in the past and, more importantly, the ones that will happen in the future. In other words, we can study a particular hypothesis and see, first, if it can explain past and present events in a manner that makes sense and sounds logical and, second, whether it helps us predict future behaviors too. In this sense, it is quite clear that while the Western approach to science can show some evident successes, the same cannot be said of the traditional Chinese approach, for instance. This is not cultural bias, the same way that observing that Michael Phelps is a better swimmer than me doesn't show cultural bias either but it's rather a pretty objective statement. It may be something that those who are in favor of an absolute egalitarian approach to social issues may dislike, but that still doesn't change its factuality.
(Edward O. Wilson: pp. 30-31)
The Enlightenment gave rise to the modern intellectual tradition of the West and much of its culture. (...) The causes of the Enlightenment's decline, which persist to the present day, illuminate the labyrinthine wellsprings of human motivation. It is worth asking, particularly in the present winter of our cultural discontent, whether the original spirit of the Enlightenment —confidence, optimism, eyes to the horizon— can be regained. And to ask in honest opposition, should it be regained, or did it possess in its first conception, as some have suggested, a dark-angelic flaw?
(...)
It has become fashionable to speak of the Enlightenment as an idiosyncratic construction by European males in a bygone era, one way of thinking among many different contructions generated across time by a legion of other minds in other cultures, each of which deserves careful and respectful attention. To which the only decent response is yes, of course —to a point. Creative thought is forever precious, and all knowledge has value. But what counts most in the long haul of history is seminality, not sentiment.
(Edward O. Wilson: pp. 21-22)
I believe that the Enlightenment thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries got it mostly right the first time. The assumption they made of a lawful material world, the intrinsic unity of knowledge, and the potential of indefinite human progress are the ones we still take most readily into our hearts, suffer without, and find maximally rewarding through intellectual advance. The greatest enterprise of the mind has always been and always will be the attempted linkage of the sciences and humanities. (...) Consilience is the key to unification. (...) The only way either to establish or to refute consilience is by methods developed in the natural science —not, I hasten to add, an effort led by scientists, or frozen in mathematical abstraction, but rather one allegiant to the habits of thought that have worked so well in exploring the material universe.
(Edward O. Wilson: pp. 8-9)
I had experienced the Ionian Enchantment. That recently coined expression I borrow from the physicist and historian Gerald Holton. It means a belief in the unity of the sciences —a conviction, far deeper than a mere working proposition, that the world is orderly and can be explained by a small number of natural laws. Its roots go back to Thales of Miletus, in Ionia, in the sixth century B.C.
(Edward O. Wilson: p. 4)