domingo, 21 de diciembre de 2008

Cryptonomicon.

A 1999 novel by Neal Stephenson, one of the best examples of postcyberpunk literature, a mixture of science fiction and historical fiction with plenty of references to science, philosophy, history, religion and many other topics. In Cryptonomicon, Stephenson explores the exploits of the cryptographers who worked at Bletchley Park during World War II, linking it to the story of their descendants, who are trying to set up a data haven in the Pacific at the end of the 20th century. Nominated for the Hugo Award in 2000, it quickly became a cult among hackers and cypherpunks.

Technical description:
Title: Cryptonomicon.
Author: Neal Stephenson.
Publisher: Arrow Books.
Edition: First edition, reimpressed, London (UK), 2007 (1999).
Pages: 918 pages.
ISBN: 0-09-941067-2

Find it on Amazon (USA, UK).

domingo, 30 de noviembre de 2008

El sabor agridulce de los recuerdos de posguerra.

La lectura de Todo Paracuellos (que, por cierto, se hace bien ligera) tiene unas consecuencias bien extrañas en el espíritu. Se trata de una de esas historias que dejan un cierto sabor agridulce en el paladar. Nos hace reír y llorar a ratos, mientras que en otros momentos no nos queda más remedio que bajar el libro y entregarnos a una apesadumbrada reflexión sobre el oscurantismo que se apoderó de nuestro país durante la inmediata posguerra. Los ojos de los niños son en realidad sobrecogedores en ocasiones. Limitados como estamos a transcribir únicamente el texto de los diálogos, seguramente no podré ni sabré transmitir la enorme carga de nostalgia, sufrimiento y amargura que encierran estas páginas. Basten unas pinceladas para que el lector pueda hacerse una somera idea. He aquí, por ejemplo, una conversación entre dos chavales del "hogar":
— Anoche mi padre me contó que se ha vuelto a casar con... otra mujer que yo no conozco... y tiene hijos con ella. Dos niñas y un niño.
— ¿Y esos también están en los hogares?
— No, esos no. Esos viven con mi padre y la mujer de mi padre en nuestra casa de Madrid. Mira, mejor... así cuando mi padre me saque tendré con quién jugar.

(Giménez: pp. 490-491)

Ni que decir tiene que el padre, pese a todas las promesas, nunca le saca del "hogar". Y nosotros lo sabemos de sobra, lo cual no hace sino añadir mayor tristeza al diálogo. El padre es un falangista sinvergüenza, un vividor que se aprovecha de haber terminado la guerra en el bando de los vencedores para acostarse con el mayor número posible de mujeres y abandonar a su hijo en el orfanato. Eso sí, el mismo hijo se lo ve venir, como queda claro en este otro diálogo de los dos mismos caracteres:
— ¡Qué bien lo estamos pasando! ¿Eh, Hormiga?
— ¡Fenómeno! Pablito... ¿tú tienes padre?
— No, sólo madre.
— ¿Tu madre, cuando entra en una tienda, dice "Arriba España"?
— No sé. Mi madre no entra en ninguna tienda. Está enferma en un sanatorio.
— Es que mi padre, cuando entra en algún sitio, dice "¡Arriba España!" Todo el mundo dice "buenos días" y él "¡Arriba España!"... y lo dice como gritando. ¡Y me da una vergüenza...!
— Lo hará para llamar la atención, para hacerse el chulito...
— ¡Eso es lo que me da vergüenza! A veces le contestan mal. Cuando fuimos a hacernos la foto, había un señor en la tienda que le dijo: "¡menos gritos, milagritos!"
— ¡Ja, ja, ja...! "¡Menos gritos, milagritos!" ¡Qué risa...!

(Giménez: pp. 582-583)

El libro entero está repleto de historias enternecedoras y, al mismo tiempo, afiladas, desgarradoras, ácidas. Debe haber pocas obras que reflejen tan bien el ambiente de la posguerra española. Lo recomiendo encarecidamente. Todo Paracuellos es, sin lugar a dudas, una de las obras maestras del comic español.

Una historia en la Historia.

Novela histórica dirigida al lector juvenil que narra las vicisitudes del joven Claudio, víctima de las burlas de sus familiares, amigos y compañeros de escuela debido a su cojera y tartamudez. Pese a todo (y pese a las conspiraciones de su abuela Livia para deshacerse de él), Claudio consigue imponerse a las circunstancias y llegar a emperador precisamente debido a sus limitaciones físicas.

El libro de Marianelli es de lectura obligatoria en el primer curso de ESO en la escuela a la que asiste mi hijo Nicolás, así que no me queda más remedio que leerla para echarle una mano con los comentarios.

Ficha técnica:
Título: Una historia en la Historia.
Autor: Sauro Marianelli.
Editorial: Bruño.
Edición: Decimosexta edición, Madrid (España), abril 2008.
Páginas: 233 páginas, incluyendo preguntas y comentarios.
ISBN: 842-160-9971

martes, 18 de noviembre de 2008

Todo Paracuellos.

Edición en un solo volumen de Paracuellos que recopila la serie completa de historietas dibujada por Carlos Giménez entre 1977 y 2003 en la que retrata las experiencias de los huérfanos de la Guerra Civil acogidos por la Obra Nacional de Auxilio Social. Uno de los clásicos del cómic español, sin lugar a dudas.

Ficha técnica:
Título: Todo Paracuellos.
Autor: Carlos Giménez.
Editorial: DeBolsillo.
Edición: Tercera edición, Barcelona (España), febrero 2008.
Páginas: 608 páginas.
ISBN: 978-84-8346-324-6

miércoles, 12 de noviembre de 2008

The art of triangulation.

In the mid- to late-nineties, the concept of triangulation was all the rage among political commentators in the US. Morris, widely considered as its father, describes it for us in his book:
The key is to recognize that it is legitimate for Republicans to worry about the elderly, education, and the environment. It is okay for Democrats to work to solve crime and welfare and to hold down taxes. Issues are not the preserve of one party or the other. Candidates, to be effective, need to cross over and show their ability to solve the other side's problems.

Bill Clinton proved this to be so. But the Republicans have yet to realize they can use their basic issues of less taxation and government regulation to win elections only if they offer credible programs for education, the environment, the elderly, and economic growth. But as long as Republicans offer no real alternatives on these Democratic issues, voters will continue to reject them. Voters will not seek low taxes and limited government at the price of jettisoning their concerns over the Democratic issues.

In addressing the other party's issues, a "me too" campaign never works. To be successful, a candidate cannot jusst mimic his opponent's rhetoric or programs; rather, he has to invent a new range of solutions to the problems historically associated with the other party. In the 1996 campaign, Clinton did not merely parrot Republican proposals, he sought to defuse the pressure for GOP programs by using Democratic means to achieve Republican goals.

(Morris: pp. 51-52).

In other words, triangulation consists in "stealing" your opponents strong issues by taking a different approach in its resolution. As such, it sounds a lot like the Third Way proposed by Clinton, Blair, Schroeder and others, something similar to the concept of the radical center, which attempts to come up with a centrist path by combining the solutions coming from both sides of the aisle in the left-right divide. It's a position that doesn't have much credit these days, in spite of the fact that Barack Obama himself has applied it to his own campaign to a great extent (although without making a big deal of it, to be sure). I understand this position may have acquired a bad reputation after Blair went out supporting Bush's adventure in Iraq, but the fact is that the position itself continues making sense, I think. Simply put, today's problems are of a completely different nature than the one the old ideologies of left and right tried to answer. And yet, they still defend certain values (equality, freedom, tradition, etc.) that are obviously timeless. To this, we also should add the fact that today's voters are far more educated and sophisticated than in the past. They dislike being treated like sport fans who are expected to join in cheering chants according to an already written libretto, preferring to choose on their own. Catechisms should be thrown out the window.

Political scandals and their ability to mobilize voters.

Morris doesn't seem to believe that political scandals have any influence whatsoever:
Scandal sells newspapers, radio programs, and TV shows. It just doesn't move voters. It attracts those who are already decided politically —base voters of either party— to the TV set, but it does little to influence the real playing ground of our politics: the independent middle.

(Morris: p. 45)

I beg to differ. It all depends on the type of political scandal we are referring to. If it only involves personal issues, as I've indicated somewhere else, I do agree they end up having little influence over electoral behaviors. On the other hand, if they involve political corruption, their effects could be the key to winning or losing an election. I do believe voters these days are way too sophisticated to fall into the sensationalistic trap that political strategists sometimes like to use. They are too often described as brainless, amorphous individuals who can be easily influenced by political marketing. Far from that, today's average voter is more educated than in the past, and also more adept at reading and interpreting messages from the media, separating the wheat from the chaff without much trouble.

Oh, and one more thing: I don't completely agree with Morris' assessment that today's elections are won by attracting "the independent middle". Yes, the "floating vote", the voters who could go either way at the last minute, is important. However, I am convinced there is another sociological group that is far more influential in the final outcome of the elections but that is usually underestimated: the one that goes out to vote sometimes but decides to stay home in other circumstances. This is the group that can make or break elections, I think. Yet, precisely because they sometimes stay home and their vote is not counted, political scientists and consultants confuse things and blame the shifts on "independent voters". Let me put it this way: I think that, for the most part, there are no independent voters. The vast majority of people feel identified with one or another side of the political spectrum, and rarely change their views. When they do, it tends to be for a period of years (for instance, people who used to vote Democrat change their preferences at a given point and start voting for the Republicans consistently). One way or another, there is no such a thing as a true "floating vote" (or, at least, not a group that is statistically significant enough to decide the elections, I think). However, there are plenty of people on both sides of the aisle who may or may not turn out to vote. These are the ones who decide the elections. Why would political scientists then fall for the idea that there is such a thing as a significant group of independent voters? The reason lies precisely in the way this behavior I am referring to here shows in the election results. Suppose there is a group of voters A who tend to vote for the Democrats, and a group B that leans towards the Republicans. If voting group A becomes actively involved in an election and goes out to vote while group B stays homes, the Democrats will win. On the other hand, if in the next elections group A stays home and group B goes out to vote, the Republicans will win. A quick look at the results will seem to clearly show the existence of a group of "independent voters" who sometimes vote for the Democrats and some other times vote for the Republicans, in spite of the fact that the reality is not truly like that. I am obviously not arguing that there are no independent voters out there, but rather that their importance is usually overestimated, I think. On the other hand, the voting group that I think is truly vital to a winning strategy (i.e., the one one that sometimes votes and some other times decides to stay home) is usually overlooked. I also think Obama's campaign proves that my hypothesis is more correct than Morris'.

Clinton and personal scandals in contemporary politics.

Quite a few people were surprised to see in the late 1990s that no political (or personal) scandal seemed to have any effect on Bill Clinton's popularity level. The clearest example of this was, of course, the Lewinsky scandal. The Republicans strategists thought they had finally caught Clinton in a situation that would pretty much force him to resign or that, at the very least, would have a significant cost for the Democrats at the ballot box. Morris, however, has a completely different approach to the issue:
One of the reasons politicians like Clinton have proven less vulnerable than one might expect to constant attacks on their characters, is that voters don't want to have to trust a candidate to make decisions for them. They want their elected officials on a shorter leash. Voters now insist that a candidate spell out his program, his vision, his ideas, and then they will elect him to fulfill that specific mandate. As Tina Turner sang, "What's love got to do with it?"

(Morris: pp. 32-33)

I'm not sure I totally agree with Morris' view though. I am convinced voters view a politician as a professional these days: as long as he delivers, we don't have to care about his personal affairs. To put it a different way: do we want to see the Government (or even media) mingle with our own personal affairs? I believe the centrality of media these days has led people to learn the importance of privacy. Sure, ogling into other people's lives is tempting, and everybody does it to one extent or another. Yet, we also know that each person's life is his or her own. We have learned to respect that, at least in general terms. As a matter of fact, I'd say that the main reason that makes a given type of media that specializes in airing information about the private lives of big stars so popular is directly related to the fact that people see it as mere entertainment. In other words, people who consume this type of media is fully aware that the whole thing may not be more than a big lie, a marketing plot set up to spread a given public image of the star in question. People are far more media savvy than we want to give them credit for. In this sense, political "scandals" that only affect the politicians' personal lives are nothing but fodder for this particular form of gossip entertainment. People couldn't care any less about them, except to gossip, discuss and joke about it. That's all. Scandals of a real political nature, of course, are a completely different thing.

Idealism as the most pragmatic course.

Although Morris' choice of title for his book may generate a good amount of mixed feelings among readers (after all, Machiavelli has come to be seen, unfair as it is, as a synonym of dirty politics and overt hipocrisy and pursuit of self-interest at any cost), the truth is that The New Prince does not read as a manual of dirty tricks. Rather, it reads as a political manual in the good old tradition started by the author of The Prince, widely considered to be the first study in Political Science. The preface already gives us a good idea of the line he follows in the rest of the book:
If American politicians were truly pragmatic and did what was really in their own best self-interest our political process would be a lot more clean, positive, nonpartisan, and issue-oriented. It is not practicality which drives the partisanship, and the never-ending cycle of investigation and recrimination in which we wallow, but a complete misapprehension of what Americans want and what politicians —in their own career self-interest— should offer. If Machiavelli were alive today, he would counsel idealism as the most pragmatic course.

(Morris: p. XV)

I totally agree with Morris on this one. How often have we heard in the past twenty years or so that the problem with contemporary politics is precisely the fact that politicians are too pragmatic (too "professional") and don't hold deep beliefs? On the contrary, I think what most citizens dislike about politics (the constant bickering, the sectarian approach to the issues, the ad-hominem attacks) have more to do with ideological dogmatism than pragmatism. Everyone is fully aware that our societies are too complex for politicians to be amateurish. This may be OK at the local level in the smallest towns, but as soon as we move to higher levels the amateur approach just doesn't cut it anymore. The people who hold most offices have to work on it full-time. They have to be professionals. There is no other choice. However, precisely because they are professionals, their main goal should be to achieve objectives, to deliver. I am convinced that citizens don't have a problem with a politician who commits mistakes or changes his mind on a particular issue, as long as he delivers. That's how voters —especially those who matter most: the independents— will judge him. They are seen as freelance advocates. And yet, Morris is right when he points out that most politicians simply are not aware of this change in perception. They continue doing politics the old way: in a partisan manner, with an ideologically-driven agenda, blinded by a set of rigid ideological principles that are seen as the magic recipe to solve all problems.

I have a little issue with Morris' choice of words though. Idealism is usually identified precisely with the sort of starry-eyed unrealistic expectation based on a given dogma. True, it doesn't have to refer only to that, but let's face it, it's what most people identify the term with. I do think a politician must have some deeply held principles or values, but she must also have an idea how to bring them to life, how to implement them in real life. Politics is the art of applying ideas to the real life by implementing it in the form of projects. It's not so different from business management after all, although most people would shy away from that comparison because it doesn't sound grandiose enough.

martes, 11 de noviembre de 2008

The New Prince. Machiavelli Updated for the 21st Century.

Dick Morris, one of Bill Clinton's political advisors and the brains behind his electoral victory in 1996, writes what he considers the essential rules for office-seekers and anyone who cares about politics. There is no theory in this book. Rather, Morris writes about the practice of running for office and doing politics based on his long experience as a political advisor to many politicians. Although his reference to Machiavelli might turn off many potential readers who may think that Morris portrays a conspiratorial way to reach power and avoid being unseated from it, the contents of the book are quite different. He simply reflects upon the essence of the political activity in the 21st century.

Technical description:
Ttitle: The New Prince. Machiavelli Updated for the Twenty-First Century.
Author: Dick Morris.
Publisher: Renaissance Books.
Edition: First Edition, Los Angeles (USA), 1999.
Pages: 252 pages.
ISBN: 1-58063-147-9

Find it on Amazon (USA, UK, in Spanish)

lunes, 10 de noviembre de 2008

The Irish monks as the saviors of ancient libraries.

After the fall of the Roman Empire, any form of sophisticated culture that previously existed disasppeared in Western Europe. The Roman Empire of the East survived to the fall of Rome, but it was far too remote to make a difference. The barbarians took over, destroyed, pillaged and ransacked. The libraries, the repositories of all the ancient knowledge, disappeared:
The western empire was scarcely a memory now. The last Latin emperor had fallen just a few years after Patrick died. And though there was still a Greek emperor in the east at Constantinople, where a small, defensible state was long established on the Bosporus, he might as well have been at Timbuktu for all his law was known in western lands. All the great continental libraries had vanished; even memory of them had been erased from the minds of those who lived in the emerging feudal societies of medieval Europe.

(Cahill: p. 181)

To Cahill, it was the Irish monks who saved that very same ancient civilization that had otherwise disappeared:
Ireland, at peace and furiosuly copying, thus stood in the position of becoming Europe's publisher. But the pagan Saxon settlements of southern England had cut Ireland off from easy commerce with the continent. While Rome and its ancient empire faded from memory and a new, iliterate Europe rose on its ruins, a vibrant, literary culture was blooming in secret along its Celtic fringe. It needed only one step more to close the circle, which would reconnect Europe to its own past by way of scribal Ireland. (...) Columcille provided that step.

(Cahill: p. 183)

I'd say he is partially right. Yes, the Irish monks did salvage plenty of ancient books and, together with them, a good part of the old knowledge. However, we shouldn't forget the important role that Bizantium and, later on, the Arabs played in this story. It is to them that we owe the most important works from the Greek masters that survived throughout these difficult times. It would be a disservice to the historical truth to emphasize only the role of the Irish because they are "Western like us" and downplay the importance of the Greeks and, above all, the Arabs, who contributed their fair share to human knowledge during a few centuries before the Renaissance took off.

But there is one more fact that I consider of the utmost importance and that Cahill never seems to consider at all: human knowledge tends to flourish whenever there is a high density of population (which tends to be associated to urban settlements) and, above all, a high density of cultural exchanges (i.e., a rich flow of information). Neither of those things happened during the Middle Ages, a dark time when the rural lifestyle supplanted the cities and people lived in isolated communities. This wouldn't change until trade increased sometime in the 15th and 16th centuries and urban spots became important again. This is something to keep in mind at times like ours, when some people start hearing the beautiful chants of the rural life once again.

City versus countryside.

The civilization of classical Antiquity (both Greek and Roman) cannot be understood without the idea of polis, urbs or city:
To Roman citizens, the place to be was a Roman city or villa. The pagus, the uncultivated countryside, inevitably suggested discomfort and hardship. The inhabitants of the paguspagani, or pagans— were country bumpkins, rustic, unrealiable, threatening. Roman Christians assumed this prejudice without examing it.

(Cahill: p. 107)

Now, this is something we may be at risk of forgetting in certain societies these days. Thanks in part to the environmentalist movement, anything rural is in. Some young people's dream is to move to a small property in the countryside and live there, surrounded by a calm life and closer to nature. Even more people's idea of a better life is to live somewhere in the suburbs, away from the stress and pollution of city life, and yet close enough to benefit from it services. One way or another, the idea has been gaining ground in the last couple of decades or so.

To a great extent, the movement that proclaims the need to return to the countryside is guided by an utopian view of what life there means. Simply put, those who were born and grew in the city are so used to certain perks that they take them for granted. However, the reality still is that, in spite of all the advances experienced in the last twenty or thirty years, life in the countryside is hard, especially if one has to live from nature's own fruits. And let's not even talk about the lack of dynamism of the economy in the country, which makes it far more difficult to find a decent job. It shouldn't surprise no one, then, that a significant amount of those who fled the city to go live in the countryside are actually professionals who saved enough and can afford some decent living there. In other words, hardly the majority of the population.

In any case, I find it important to emphasize that the city, with all its problems (yes, the pollution, criminality and high density) has given us so much: laws, political institutions, democracy, universities, technology, science, places to debate, to meet, to enjoy the diversity that can only be seen in the large cities. What sort of society would we live in without our cities? What would be the effect of large sums of people fleeing to live in the countryside? Yes, something tells me that it would be akin to a return to the Dark Age, something not so different from what happened in the Mediterranean region back then.

Augustine's "Confessions" and the beginning of self-consciousness.

As Cahill points out, Augustine of Hippo represents the first instance where self-conscience takes shape in Western literature:
If we page quickly through world literature from its beginnings to the advent of Augustine, we realize that with Augustine human consciousness takes a quantum leap forward —and becomes self-consciousness. Here for the first time is a man consistently observing himself not as Man but as this singular man —Augustine. From this point on, true autobiography becomes possible, and so does its near relative, subjective and autobiographical fiction.

(Cahill: p. 41)

Sure, before Augustine there were other instances of people writing about their experiences. However, the key was always the experiences themselves, the outside, the events. With Augustine, for the first time, it's the individual's concept of self, his own internal struggles and doubts, that is reflected on the page. Now, this would be a trivial issue if it weren't because the idea of individual is key to our civilization. Most people would agree that Western civilization is sustained on four legs: classical Antiquity (i.e., the Greek and Roman cultures), the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Age of Enlightenment and, finally, although directly linked to the previous one, modern Science. Well, in Augustine we find the first clear indication of the idea of individual, developed by the confluence between the classical civilization and both Judaism and Christianity. Neither the contemporary notion of human rights nor the idea of modern democracy would be possible without this accomplishment.

An empire that turned its back on the outside.

In page 12, Cahill shares a thought about the natural inward-looking approach of the Romans that should serve as a caution to us in the present too:
For all the splendor of Roman standard, the power of Roman boot, and the extent of Roman road, the entire empire hugs the Mediterranean like a child's village of sand, waiting to be swept into the sea. From fruitful Gaul and Britain in the north to the fertile Nile Valley in the south, from the ricky Iberian shore in the west to the parched coasts of Asia Minor, all provinces of the empire turn toward the great sea, toward Medi-Terra-nea —the Sea of Middle Earth. And as they turn to the center of their world, they turn back on all that lies behind them, beyond the Roman wall. They turn their back on the barbarians.

(Cahill: p. 12)

Great empires and large countries always tend to ignore what lies beyond their borders, considering it worthless or, at least, of less value, inferior to their own clearly superior ways and manners. This is a permanent danger in History, something that afflicted Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries and it may afflict the United States now. We should be careful here though. This is not a Western defect only, as many multiculturalists would have it nowadays. The old Chinese Empire also viewed itself as the center of the world, to the point that it referred to itself as the Empire of the Middle, and something similar can be said of the Japanese. Quite to the contrary, this is a very human fault, something intrinsic to human nature and not to this or that particular nationality or culture.

lunes, 3 de noviembre de 2008

On how the Irish monks preserved Western civilization.

Thomas Cahill soon describes the core argument of this volume at the beginning of the book:
The word Irish is seldom coupled with the word civilization. (...) And yet... Ireland, a little island at the edge of Europe that has known neither Renaissance nor Enlightenment —in some ways, a Third World country with, as John Betjeman claimed, a Stone Age culture— had one moment of unblemished glory. For, as the Roman Empire fell, as all through Europe matted, unwashed barbarians descended on the Roman cities, looting artifacts and burning books, the Irish, who were just learning to read and write, took up the great labor of copying all of western literature -everything they could lay their hands on. These scribes then served as conduits through which the Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian cultures were transmitted to the tribed of Europe, newly settled amid the rubble and ruined vineyards of the civilization they had overwhelmed. Without this Service of the Scribes, everything that happened subsequently would have been unthinkable. Without the Mission of the Irish Monks, who single-handedly refounded European civilization throughout the continent in the bays and valleys of their exile, the world that came after them would have been an entirely different one —a world without books. And our own world would never have come to be.

(Thomas Cahill: pp. 3-4)

We'll see later to what extent he manages to come up with clear evidence to back up these statements. However, it's true that until Cahill published this book the importance of the Irish contribution to Western civilization had not been stressed enough. Sure, there had been mentions here and there (Kenneth Clark's seminal work, Civilisation: A Personal View, deserves a special mention in this sense), but they had been ignored for the most part in favor of more familiar (and larger) countries. It is, unfortunately, a frequent bias in the study of History.

miércoles, 15 de octubre de 2008

El programa político de la UCD.

El programa centrista se correspondió con lo que se llevó a cabo durante la transición. Aparte de la instauración de un régimen democrático y un reparto más equitativo de la riqueza sin necesidad de recurrir a las nacionalizaciones, todo lo que se proponía era más bien de sentido común:
En el resto de los apartados programáticos UCD no se distanciaba sensiblemente de lo que ya comenzaba a considerarse normal. Una política interior basada en la defensa de la economía social de mercado, con incidencia del Estado en los sectores monopolistas y en "aquellos en los que se produzca una excesiva concentración de capital"; una política exterior de relaciones políticas plenas con todos los países y con el designio de conseguir la recuperación de la soberanía sobre Gibraltar y la integración en el Mercado Común, y una política social en libertad sindical, con jornada semanal de cuarenta horas, igualdad de derechos para el hombre y la mujer y planificación familiar asistida por la Seguridad Social.

(Chamorro: pp. 173-174)

De hecho, casi puede decirse que aquél programa centrista se ha convertido, con el paso del tiempo, en el consenso político español, las líneas maestras sobre las que llevar adelante unas políticas de Estado que contarán con el apoyo más o menos entusiasta de socialistsas y populares —salvo, quizás, en la política exterior, donde Gibraltar ha perdido la centralidad que tenía entonces y el proyecto de integración europea ha crecido sin lugar a dudas en importancia. En estos momentos, creo que puede afirmarse sin temor alguno que tanto el equipo dirigente del PP como el del PSOE se identifican en líneas generales con este programa a grandes trazos, lo cual ya supone un avance enorme comparado con las divisiones de nuestro pasado. Únicamente encontramos el deseo de ir mucho más allá de estas líneas entre ciertos sectores minoritarios de ambos partidos y, por supuesto, Izquierda Unida. Como ya digo, esto le puede parecer a algunos insuficientemente plural, pero para un país que ha conocido las divisiones sociales y políticas que ha conocido España durante los siglos XIX y XX, supone sin duda un avance.

Cabe preguntarse, sin embargo, cómo es posible que el programa político de la UCD de entonces haya sido asumido casi sin condiciones por la derecha y la izquierda (en otras palabras, que haya triunfado en todos los frentes) y, a pesar de ello, el centro político haya desaparecido del Parlamento. La respuesta, obviamente, sólo puede ser que conforme PP y PSOE se han ido corriendo hacia el centro, el votante medio no ha creído necesario entregar su apoyo a unas fuerzas políticas minoritarias cuya única función posible era la de convertirse en partidos-bisagra. En este sentido, creo que el electorado español ha cometido un gravísimo error que tarde o temprano habrá que corregir. Y digo esto por varias razones. En primer lugar, el hecho de que los partidos mayoritarios se corran hacia el centro en lo que respecta a sus políticas no quiere decir que lo hagan también en cuanto a sus formas. De hecho, cabe esperar precisamente lo contrario: conforme disminuyen las diferencias políticas de auténtico calado entre socialistas y populares, no les queda más remedio que enfatizar otros aspectos más superficiales (acusaciones de corrupción, carácter de los líderes, decisiones particulares que puedan considerarse erróneas o que al menos conllevan un claro coste político, etc.). De ahí que los niveles de crispación política no hayan hecho sino aumentar en los últimos años, precisamente conforme ambos partidos se movían ideológicamente hacia el centro. Pero es que, en segundo lugar, los dirigentes de ambos partidos son perfectamente conscientes de que no hay ningún partido de centro que pueda competir por el voto moderado, lo cual les deja la vía libre para lanzarse a una estrategia de tierra quemada en la que el voto claramente identificado con unas siglas se consolida en tanto que el voto moderado no tiene más remedio que decantarse por uno de los dos partidos mayoritarios o abstenerse. Sencillamente, la amenaza centrista o moderada no existe en los análisis electorales, lo cual redunda en una mayor polarización de las estrategias políticas y electorales (eso sí, solamente en lo que respecta al mensaje, que no al contenido mismo de las políticas que se proponen).

El arte de la negociación, según Fernado Abril Martorell.

Interesantes reflexiones de Fernando Abril Martorell recogidas en el libro:
Hay posiciones que es conveniente mantener cuando se mantienen y que, luego, hay que cederlas —meses más tarde— cuando el compromiso político lo requiere. Toda negociación entraña una búsqueda de aproximaciones, a la vista de las posiciones de los negociadores. Pero los negociadores no suelen ser plenipotenciarios, sino que negocian en calidad de representantes de unos colectivos a los que han de dar explicaciones y tiempo para incorporar los distintos elementos y términos de cada paso de la negociación.

(Chamorro: p. 109)

Sucede demasiado a menudo que olvidamos este pequeño detalle. Los negociadores son siempre representantes de intereses a menudo enfrentados, portavoces de unos colectivos sociales que no siempre han tenido el tiempo necesario de digerir y analizar las circunstancias, por no hablar de sopesar las posibles soluciones. La política real, al fin y al cabo, es siempre bastante imperfecta. No tiene nada que ver con las grandes construcciones ideológicas que algunos piensan. De hecho, en lo que respecta a la política, yo siempre prefiero primar a los valores sobre los esquemas ideológicos sólidos y predefinidos. Me parece que es la mejor forma de no abandonar el mundo de las ideas, pero evitando al mismo tiempo su demoledora tiranía.

La eterna necesidad de proceder a la reforma de la Administración Pública.

Leyendo Viaje al centro de UCD, me encuentro con unas reflexiones de Joaquín Garrigues Walker que bien pudieran aplicarse aún:
Sería muy difícil modificar los comportamientos de las instituciones públicas si no hay una profunda reforma de la Administración pública, y resulta difícil pensar que ésta se pueda hacer a corto plazo, ya sea por UCD o por cualquier otro partido. Y es difícil porque basta examinar la estructura y composición del Consejo de Ministros para darse cuenta de que si ésos tienen que reformar la Administración, la Administración va a tardar en ser reformada. Pero es que si esa reforma tiene que ser hecha por un partido como el PSOE, que teóricamente tiene voluntad reformista en ese sentido, nos encontramos con esa gran masa de funcionarios medios seguidores del PSOE, que se opondrán con rigor, y la reforma, igualmente, irá para largo.

(Chamorro: pp. 82-83)

Y es que la tan traída y llevada reforma de la Administración pública, como bien previera Garrigues Walker, ha ocupado a menudo el lugar central de las ambiciones reformistas de nuestros políticos, pero de momento casi todas las promesas han caído en saco roto. Digo "casi" porque algo se ha avanzado, la verdad. Tampoco hay que ser tan pesimista. Nuestra Administración se ha modernizado, se ha puesto al día, y en buena parte ha conseguido incluso profesionalizarse y abrirse a la sociedad gracias al uso de las oposiciones, por mucho que las denostemos. Cierto, queda aún mucho por hacer. El enchufismo sigue siendo un mal endémico en nuestra sociedad (por cierto, no solamente en la esfera pública, sino también en la empresa privada, todo hay que decirlo) y la Administración todavía requiere avanzar mucho para mejorar su eficiencia y productividad, en lugar de poner obstáculos constantes en la creación de riqueza por parte de nuestras empresas y sacar de quicio a nuestros conciudadanos cuando hayan de hacer sus gestiones.

El problema, claro, está en cómo llevar a cabo dichas reformas cuando, como acertadamente indicaba Garrigues Walker, la amplia mayoría de nuestros políticos son, precisamente, funcionarios. Este debe ser uno de los pocos países avanzados donde hasta la derecha se muestra orgullosa de contar con líderes y portavoces supuestamente muy capaces no por los problemas que hayan solucionado en el transcurso de su carrera política, ni tampoco por sus acertados análisis políticos, sociales o económicos, ni mucho menos por su demostrado éxito a la hora de crear una empresa de éxito, sino únicamente por haber pasado unas oposiciones a abogado del Estado con honores. Y es que la mentalidad del opositor está tan extendida entre nosotros que hasta quienes —se supone— han subrayar la importancia de la innovación y halagar el espíritu emprendedor se deshacen en elogios ante quienes simplemente demuestran la suficiente capacidad de memorización como para destacar en unas oposiciones. Vamos, que en un contexto en el que la mayor ilusión de cualquier madre es que su retoño acabe trabajando para la Administración pública y, una vez llegado ahí, se agarre con uñas y dientes a los derechos adquiridos, se hace bien difícil coger el toro por los cuernos y afrontar la siempre pospuesta reforma. Supongo que, tarde o temprano, alguien se atreverá a hacerla, pero uno ya puede imaginarse las huelgas y manifestaciones que paralizarán el país de punta a punta.

Centro como moderación.

El centro político nunca ha sido fácil de definir. Desde la izquierda se lo considera, a menudo, un mero trasunto del conservadurismo y la derecha, mientras que desde ésta se piensa que le hace el juego al progresismo. Al final, la mejor definición sea quizá no una que defienda su equidistancia de los dos polos —algo, por otro lado, realmente imposible—, sino su afirmación de la moderación en las formas:
La fórmula UCD, que estoy tratando de analizar, sólo se explica como sugerencia de un terreno de juego en el que, a tenor de los conflictos internos, lo único que se puede ofrecer al exterior del partido, como oferta electoral y como proyecto político de sociedad, es un emblema de moderación.

(Chamorro: p. 76)

En este sentido, tiene poco de sorprendente que los españoles decidieran apostar por la moderación (y, por consiguiente, por quienes mejor la representaban durante la transición, esto es, la UCD) en un intento de huir de un pasado reciente dominado por los radicalismos, la intolerancia y el maximalismo que dejaron tantos muertos sobre nuestra tierra. El mismo Chamorro lo deja bien claro en su libro:

Por lo que respecta al primer punto, a la articulación consensual hacia el exterior, UCD es un partido de engarce ideológico entre socialdemócratas, liberales y democristianos que se articularon como mejor fórmula de desenvolvimiento frente a la derecha tradicionaly franquista, por un lado, y la izquierda clásica, por el otro. Ese engarce ideológico se vio favorecido con la decisión mayoritaria -aunque relativa en términos parlamentarios- de voto de un electorado que si por algo estaba era por la normalización y por el deseo de que no se repitiera el viejo rictus histórico en el que las cosas se salieran de quicio y llegaran a más.

(Chamorro: p. 225)

Ahora bien, basar toda la identidad política de UCD en la moderación tuvo también su coste: conforme PSOE y AP fueron virando hacia el centro, le fueron achicando espacios. Si entendemos esto, y sumado a las propias divisiones internas de un partido aglutinado más en torno al poder que a cualquier programa o proyecto más o menos definido, no puede sorprendernos el destino fatal del partido tras las elecciones de 1982. Sencillamente, desaparecido el aglutinante fundamental (esto es, el poder), UCD dejó de tener una razón para existir. Los elementos socialdemócratas se marcharon al PSOE, los democristianos al PP y los liberales al CDS.

La transición y el Estado de las Autonomías: ¿un proyecto cerrado en falso?

Mucho se ha estado escribiendo últimamente sobre la transición a la democracia y sus errores y limitaciones. Fundamentalmente desde la izquierda del espectro político, se ha ido subiendo algo el volumen en las críticas contra todo el proceso, subrayando las concesiones que se tuvieron que hacer a la derecha más reaccionaria para garantizar unas libertades democráticas que en otros lugares se consideraban lógicas desde hacía décadas. En lo que respecta a la transición, yo lo tengo bien claro: si el precio a pagar para construir un sistema democrático sólido por primera vez nuestra historia, obtener la legalización de todos los partidos políticos y conceder la amnistía a quienes se enfrentaron valientemente contra la dictadura franquista era aceptar la Monarquía sin pasar antes por un referéndum y renunciar a juzgar a quienes lideraron la feroz represión de la Dictadura, me parece que se hizo bien. Cada uno puede tener las preferencias personales que sea con respecto a lo que pueda considerarse la mejor forma política del Estado —yo, personalmente, prefiero la forma republicana, pero no tengo problema alguno en aceptar la monarquía "de forma accidental", tal y como dijeran las derechas con respecto a la Segunda República—, pero de lo que no cabe duda alguna es de que para la amplia mayoría de españoles el tema no es prioritario en estos momentos. Cierto, no hay tradición monárquica y la gente siente más respeto por el Rey Juan Carlos en particular que por la institución en sí, pero la verdad es que son bien pocos quienes consideran este asunto como altamente prioritario en estos momentos.

Lo mismo cabe decir, me parece, de los verdugos de la represión franquista. La amplia mayoría de españoles tiene bien asumido que el franquismo fue una dictadura de corte claramente fascista durante su primer fase, para después pasar a convertirse en un régimen autoritario conservador y tradicionalista con un evidente apoyo de la Iglesia. Dudo mucho que haya más de un 15% ó 20% de españoles que no estén dispuestos a aceptarlo. Sin embargo, no nos queda más remedio que reconocer desde la izquierda, que ni todos los que combatieron del lado de Franco durante la Guerra Civil fueron fascistas confesos ni todo el que combatió por defender a la República fue un "luchador por la democracia y la libertad", como algunos se empeñan en afirmar. Una vez más, tengo bien claro por qué bando hubiera me hubiera decantado yo personalmente si me hubiera tocado vivir aquellos fatídicos años. No obstante, ello no quita para que deje de reconocer que en muchos casos fue la mera casualidad la que decantó a los individuos para que tomaran las armas en favor de uno u otro bando. Además, no hay forma de negar los excesos que se cometieron en el lado republicano, ni tampoco la inspiración totalitaria de alimentaban muchos, sobre todo quienes se identificaban con el PCE. Las cosas son como son. Es verdad, si las potencias democráticas hubieran salido en defensa de la República desde el inicio del conflicto, es bien probable que la democracia liberal representativa hubiers vencido en el campo de batalla, pero eso nunca sucedió debido al temor a iniciar una nueva y cruenta guerra en suelo europeo. Sea como fuere, es innegable que a partir de 1937 es la Unión Soviética de Stalin y sus agentes del Comintern quienes toman la iniciativa en el bando republicano. Las cosas son como son, y no como nos gustara que hubieran sido. ¿Que quienes perdieron la guerra también tienen derecho a enterrar a sus muertos? Sin lugar a dudas. ¿Que no podemos permitir que se honre únicamente a uno de los bandos que se enfrentaron en aquella guerra fratricida? De acuerdo. Pero no saquemos los pies del tiesto. No pasemos de ahí a reivindicar el derecho a la revancha.

Pero hay un elemento más de aquella transición que sigue teniendo tanta actualidad treinta años después como la tuvo en aquellos momentos. Se trata del proceso de descentralización administrativa y la construcción del llamado Estado de las Autonomías. Como recuerda Chamorro, las manifestaciones en favor de la democracia que se sucedieron en aquella época reivindicavan tres cosas, fundamentalmente:
Los momentos de la transición en que con mayor encono se enfrentaron los partidarios de la reforma con los de la ruptura se habían visto jalonados por los gritos en la calle de "Libertad, amnistía y estatuto de autonomía". Lo de libertad y amnistía estuvo siempre muy claro para los gobernantes y para los gobernados, para los políticos y para el electorado. Pero no así lo del estatuto de autonomía.

(Chamorro: p. 42)

Pues bien, de las tres reivindicaciones —libertad, amnistía y estatuto de autonomía—, la última es la que no se llevó finalmente a cabo hasta mediados los años ochenta y, en cierto modo, podemos aún considerar abierta. Para empezar, nadie tenía en mente durante la transición proceder a la descentralización administrativa en todo el Estado. Lo que se esperaba más bien era que solamente ciertas regiones y nacionalidades —fundamentalmente las mismas que ya lograron un cierto grado de autonomía durante las Segunda República o que estaban en proceso de conseguirla en aquél entonces, es decir, Cataluña, Euskadi, Galicia y Andalucía— gozaran de una cierta transferencia de poderes bastante limitada. Ya sabemos que, después, por razones de estrategia política y de lo que entonces pasó a denominarse agravio comparativo, la cosa se fue un poco de las manos y acabamos con diecisiete autonomías. Pero es que, en segundo lugar, nadie esperaba que el nivel de descentralización llegara a tal punto que se difuminaran las diferencias entre nuestro Estado de las Autonomías y un Estado federal. Como decía, si acaso se esperaba concederles a los gobiernos autonómicos unas competencias muy claramente delimitadas, algo parecido a lo que se hiciera durante la República. Por consiguiente, resulta que, al menos en este aspecto, la Constitución de 1978 sobrepasa con creces lo que estableciera la de 1931, por más que tanto izquierdista de pacotilla —que seguramente no se haya leído jamás el documento constitucional de la Segunda República— asuma lo contrario. Por si todo esto fuera poco, resulta también que la Constitución de 1978 deja el proyecto autonómico completamente abierto: ni contiene un listado completo de cuáles puedan ser las distintas autonomías, ni tampoco estipula claramente el reparto de competencias. Esto, que para algunos es un defecto que no hace sino generar confusión, para mí es de hecho un aspecto positivo, pues proporciona a nuestra Carta Magna una flexibilidad que no tendría de otra forma. De hecho, me parece que el mayor acierto de quienes se encargaron de la redacción del documento constitucional de 1978 fue precisamente el saber combinar la definición de unos principios fundamentales de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico claramente establecidos con un amplio margen de maniobra para su flexibilidad que permite las fleibilidad suficiente en su interpretación como para permitir el pluralismo político. A otros, esto les parecerá el máximo ejemplo de inseguridad y confusión en los principios, pero a mí, por el contrario, me parece muestra de una enorme sabiduría.

The central idea of consilience.

How does Wilson define consilience? The best description I found in the book is here:
The central idea of the consilience world view is that all tangible phenomena, from the birth of stars to the workings of social institutions, are based on material processes that are ultimately reducible, however long and tortuous the sequences, to the laws of physics. In support of this idea is the conclusion of biologists that humanity is kin to all other life forms by common descent.

(Edward O. Wilson: p. 266)

Now, we should be careful to distinguish this position from a simple-minded mechanicism. Those who oppose science as a limited form of knowledge —yes, it's not only the Americans who oppose it in the name of religion; here in Europe there are plenty of people who oppose the scientific worldview in the name of a badly understood humanism that stresses the arts and considers anything that's related to science and technology as something "too cold and inhuman"— like to criticize this position as "reductionism". However, this is not what Wilson proposes. First of all, we should be careful when equating the laws of physics with good old mechanicism. That might have been true of the classical mechanics, the Newtonian physics of yesteryear, but today's physics are far more complex than that. To think that resorting to the laws of physics to explain the phenomena we observe is reductionist (in the sense of stupidly simplistic) is quite naive or, even worse, ignorant. Today's physics is nothing but overly complex and more than capable of accepting non-deterministic behaviors in its theories. Second, and most importantly, Wilson's objective is to find a field of knowledge that could make it possible to synthesize all human knowledge (i.e., the theory of everything that we have been after lately), and to be fair physics seems to be the discipline that is getting closest to that. The social sciences are, without any doubt, way too far from objective knowledge in any form or shape. There are only two positions that we can take regarding this issue: either we continue their original project, convinced that it is possible to study the human being in an objective manner, or we just give up in despair and choose to stress that human nature is different, which seems to be the Postmodern approach. It's clear to us which is Wilson's preferred option: he chooses to reaffirm the validity of the Enlightenment and its project of universal knowledge.

There is one more criticism of the scientific mindset that Wilson also deals with. Those who oppose the scientific methodology as the best way to achieve knowledge, emphasize the fragmentary nature of our knowledge these days. There is an excess of information everywhere, they remind us. Not only that but, for each possible explanation or theory that we hear about a particular fact, there always are several other alternative approaches. Worse yet, we have no way to figure out which one is correct. Postmodernism loves this position, emphasizing fragmentation and plurality and dismissing science as dogmatic, bent on imposing a single true explanation that, in reality, nobody can prove beyond any doubt. As I said, Wilson also addresses this issue:
Thanks to science and technology, access to factual knowledge of all kinds is rising exponentially while dropping in unit cost. It is destined to become global and democratic. Soon it will be available everywhere on television and computer screens. What then? The answer is clear: synthesis. We are drowning in information, while starving for wisdom. The world henceforth will be run by synthesizers, people able to put together the right information at the right time, think critically about it, and make important choices wisely.

(Edward O. Wilson: p. 269)

In other words, he doesn't deny the existence of a plurality of explanations. He doesn't believe in the imposition of the Truth either. I think we all understand that these days. Yes, we have somehow internalized the postmodern criticism —which is at least partially valid— that, even if we accept the existence of an objective reality out there, our own knowledge of it may always be partial, incomplete, imperfect. And yet, we cannot just give up and fall back into an affirmation of subjectivity, like the postmodern thinkers do. Sure, a dogmatic belief in an objective Truth could potentially lead to a totalitarian ideology, but a simple look back at our own History will also teach us that nihilism has the very same effect: the lack of an objective way to measure things agreed upon by all social agents leads to the world of the jungle, where the stronger imposes his will over everybody else. Wilson knows all that. He knows the dangers of both dogmatism and nihilism. What he proposes is a firm belief in the scientific method as the best possible way to achieve knowledge, even if he fully understands this knowledge will always be limited and partial. That is, nevertheless, no reason to give up, especially when science has already proven to be the only methodology that got us closer to real knowledge of how things work. I have to agree with him.

martes, 14 de octubre de 2008

How the Irish Saved the World.

Part of a wider project that the author calls The Hinges of History, where he sets to study and "retell the story of the Western world as the story of the great gift-givers, those who entrusted to our keeping one or another of the singular treasures that make up the patrimony of the West" (a project that, in principle, also includes a second volume titled The Gifts of the Jews), this book tells us the story of how the Irish monks managed to keep the heritage of Western civilization (i.e., the Greek and Roman classics, as well as the Jewish and early Christian works) to pass it to posterity.

Technical description:
Title: How the Irish Saved Civilization: The Untold Story of Ireland's Heroic Role from the Fall of Rome to the Rise of Medieval Europe.
Author: Thomas Cahill.
Publisher: Doubleday
Edition: First paperback edition, New York (USA), March 1996.
Pages: 249 pages, including index and illustrations.
ISBN: 0-385-41849-3

sábado, 11 de octubre de 2008

Viaje al centro de UCD.

Un libro a caballo entre el análisis político y el reportaje histórico donde se nos habla de los orígenes de UCD, el papel fundamental que desempeñó durante la transición a la democracia y las constantes divisiones internas como consecuencia del enfrentamiento entre familias. Finaliza con información (muy breve, eso sí) sobre la dimisión de Adolfo Suárez y el II Congreso del partido.

Descripción técnica:
Título: Viaje al centro de UCD.
Autor: Eduardo Chamorro.
Editorial: Planeta
Edición: primera edición, Barcelona (España), junio de 1981.
Páginas: 326, incluyendo índices.
ISBN: 84-320-3589-0

Bridging the gap between science and humanities.

It has become a commonplace to mention C.P. Snow's The Two Cultures seminal work when discussing the often difficult relations between the sciences and the humanities. Wilson offers a possible solution that may help us bridge the gap:
There is only one way to unite the great branches of learning and end the culture wars. It is to view the boundary between the scientific and literary cultures not as a territorial line but as a broad and mostly unexplored terrain awaiting cooperative entry form both sides. (...) The two cultures share the following challenge. We know that virtually all of human behavior is transmitted by culture. We also know that biology has an important effect on the origin of culture and its transmission. The question remaining is how biology and culture interact, and in particular how they interact across all societies to create the commonalities of human nature.

(Edward O. Wilson: p. 126)

Removing the "territorial lines" between the two is, obviously, not so easy, especially taking into account that plenty of people's livelihoods depend precisely on these boundaries. Yet, Wilson is absolutely right. The divide cannot be bridged by having one side or the other claim final victory. The debate has already lasted long enough for us to realize that they both have a point. We cannot understand the human being and our surroundings without resorting to both types of knowledge. The task now ought to be finding out how they interact with each other which will inevitably require the work of "synthesizers", people with the ability to speak both languages. That is the challenge we have in front of us, and we'd better make sure we start introducing that idea into our schools.

martes, 7 de octubre de 2008

The undelivered promises of chaos theory.

Wilson's defense of the idea of consilience inevitably brings up to mind the highly complex world of chaos theory:
The most interesting feature of chaos in populations is that it can be produced by exactly defined properties of real organisms. Contrary to previous belief, chaotic patterns are not necessarily the product of randomly acting forces of the environment that rock the population up and down. In this case and in many other complex physical phenomena, chaos theory provides an authentically deep principle of nature. It says that extremely complicated, outwardly indecipherable patterns can be determined by small, measurable changes within the system.

But, again, which systems, which changes? That is the nub of the problem. None of the elements of complexity theory has anything like the generality and the fidelity to factual detail we wish from theory. None has triggered an equivalent cascade of theoretical innovations and practical applications. What does complexity theory need to be successful in biology?

(Edward O. Wilson: p. 90)

In other words, the idea that complicated patterns of behavior may be explained by small, measurable changes (which is at the very core of chaos theory) is perfectly compatible with the idea of consilience. As a matter of fact, Stephen Wolfram's A New Kind of Science can be seen precisely as one attempt to combine them both. However, as Wilson points out, chaos theory has failed to deliver on its promises so far. Sure, there is still plenty of work to do in the field and we cannot completely rule out a sudden discovery that will revolutionize scientific knowledge, but the reality is that as of today it doesn't offer the answers that we are after.

lunes, 6 de octubre de 2008

The risks of multiculturalism: the Chinese example.

We often hear about the need to respect other cultures and promote multiculturalism these days. The need to promote respect for other cultures is one of those things that sounds quite obvious. But, as it tends to happen with these issues, the devil is in the details. What do we mean by respecting other cultures? Leaving them alone? Does that mean forgetting about them even when we can help (for instance, to help them fight against a large epidemic)? And what about intervening in order to stop genocide or major crimes against humanity? Should we just watch from the outside then so we cannot be accused of cultural imperialism? Also, does respecting other cultures mean to consider them as equals (not in the sense of their individual rights, of course, but in the sense that we have to assume that their accomplishments are equal to ours)? All these are complex questions without a very easy answer but they certainly illustrate the paradoxes that a simplistic multiculturalist approach entails.

Science has often been at the center of the criticism against Western cultural imperialism leveled by those who defend a multicultural approach, and Wilson is clearly aware of it:
Between the first and thirteenth centuries they led Europe by a wide margin. But according to Joseph Needham, the principal Western chronicler of Chinese scientific endeavors, their focus stayed on holistic properties and on the harmonious, hierarchical relationships of entities, from stars down to mountains and flowers and sand. In this world view the entities of Nature are inseparable and perpetually changing, not discrete and constant as perceived by the Enlightenment thinkers. As a result the Chinese never hit upon the entry point of abstraction and break-apart analytic research attained by European science in the seventeenth century.

(Edward O. Wilson: pp. 30-31)
You see, multiculturalists take the typically postmodern approach that everything is relative. Therefore, there is no way to judge anything. Actually, there may not even be any anything to judge, since there is no evidence whatsoever that there is a world outside our own minds in the first place. It's relativism taken to its highest form. Yet, what Wilson is telling us here is that there is indeed a way to judge. There is a yardstick that we can use to measure things against. In the case of knowledge, it consists of the extent to which a particular theory manages to explain events in the past and, more importantly, the ones that will happen in the future. In other words, we can study a particular hypothesis and see, first, if it can explain past and present events in a manner that makes sense and sounds logical and, second, whether it helps us predict future behaviors too. In this sense, it is quite clear that while the Western approach to science can show some evident successes, the same cannot be said of the traditional Chinese approach, for instance. This is not cultural bias, the same way that observing that Michael Phelps is a better swimmer than me doesn't show cultural bias either but it's rather a pretty objective statement. It may be something that those who are in favor of an absolute egalitarian approach to social issues may dislike, but that still doesn't change its factuality.

So, when it comes to the best way to obtain knowledge about our surroundings, we ought to ask ourselves which has proven so far to be the best methodology, the one that has shown the best results, the one that has proven to lead to hypothesis or theories that can better explain the events that happened in the past as well as the ones that are still to come with at least a decent level of approximation. And, when it comes to this particular question, it seems evident that the Western approach to science wins hands down. Everything else is either wishful thinking or denying the evidence that's in front of our eyes.

A possible dark side to the Enlightenment and the criticisms from the politically correct pundits.

In spite of Wilson's faith in the Enlightenment and its intellectual project in favor of human progress, he is fully aware of its own problems and limitations. It is, in other words, a critical support that he provides:
The Enlightenment gave rise to the modern intellectual tradition of the West and much of its culture. (...) The causes of the Enlightenment's decline, which persist to the present day, illuminate the labyrinthine wellsprings of human motivation. It is worth asking, particularly in the present winter of our cultural discontent, whether the original spirit of the Enlightenment —confidence, optimism, eyes to the horizon— can be regained. And to ask in honest opposition, should it be regained, or did it possess in its first conception, as some have suggested, a dark-angelic flaw?

(...)

It has become fashionable to speak of the Enlightenment as an idiosyncratic construction by European males in a bygone era, one way of thinking among many different contructions generated across time by a legion of other minds in other cultures, each of which deserves careful and respectful attention. To which the only decent response is yes, of course —to a point. Creative thought is forever precious, and all knowledge has value. But what counts most in the long haul of history is seminality, not sentiment.

(Edward O. Wilson: pp. 21-22)

The second paragraph is directly aimed at those who defend the politically correct. Yes, it has been mainly white men who contributed to Western culture but, then, how could it have been otherwise in a traditional society dominated precisely by... well, white men? And what does that mean, exactly? What does it imply? Does a tree still fall in the forst if we don't hear it? Is a particular scientific theory perhaps not correct simply because it was discovered or laid out by an "old white man"? Are we truly so brain-dead that we have managed to politicize every single field of human activity? We can call what happened in 1492 a "discovery", a "meeting point", an "accident", a "crash of civilizations" or whatever anyone sees fit. We can also stress that the Vikings, the Celts or some advanced extraterrestrial culture settled down in America before Chistopher Columbus and his men arrived that year, but that still doesn't change the fact that it wasn't until 1492 that a permanent and continuous relationship between both sides of the Atlantic started. As Wilson points out, it's seminality that matters, and not our sentiments.

A firm belief in the project of the Enlightenment.

Wilson is obviously a fan of the Englightenment. How else could anyone defend the idea of consilience? From a traditional religious approach, the world is a fundamentally a mystery, something created by a superior Being and beyond our comprehension. From a more contemporary postmodern approach, God may be out of the picture but the end result is still the same: reality is either impossible to comprehend or, on the contrary, a mosaic put together from thousands, millions of different viewpoints, which once again renders the task impossible. Against that vital pessimism, Wilson prefers to affirm the foundations of the project of the Enlightenment:
I believe that the Enlightenment thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries got it mostly right the first time. The assumption they made of a lawful material world, the intrinsic unity of knowledge, and the potential of indefinite human progress are the ones we still take most readily into our hearts, suffer without, and find maximally rewarding through intellectual advance. The greatest enterprise of the mind has always been and always will be the attempted linkage of the sciences and humanities. (...) Consilience is the key to unification. (...) The only way either to establish or to refute consilience is by methods developed in the natural science —not, I hasten to add, an effort led by scientists, or frozen in mathematical abstraction, but rather one allegiant to the habits of thought that have worked so well in exploring the material universe.

(Edward O. Wilson: pp. 8-9)

In a world taken over by the New Age craze, creationism, cultural relativism and superstitions of all types, it's certainly nice to read such a firm statement in favor of the intellectual project that brought about democracy, tolerance and social progress, among many other things. It's not a very trendy position to take, but it's now more necessary than ever.

The Ionian Enchantment

Edward O. Wilson tells us pretty quick what the book's main thesis is:
I had experienced the Ionian Enchantment. That recently coined expression I borrow from the physicist and historian Gerald Holton. It means a belief in the unity of the sciences —a conviction, far deeper than a mere working proposition, that the world is orderly and can be explained by a small number of natural laws. Its roots go back to Thales of Miletus, in Ionia, in the sixth century B.C.

(Edward O. Wilson: p. 4)

It is, after all, the same idea behind the project of the Enlightenment, the assumption that behind all the chaos of nature lies a basic order that can be discovered by the human mind. Today's theory of everything takes inspiration in the very same approach too. It states the belief in a concept, a unifying story that ultimately makes sense of it all. It's a position obviously set against the more pessimistic postmodern philosophy that became popular in the 1980s. Yet, the most intriguing aspect of all this, I think, is that Wilson's "belief in the unity of the sciences" is no different than a faith, really. There is little difference between this and religious faith, on the other hand. He remains convinced that "the world is orderly and can be explained by a small number of natural laws", but there is nothing like a proof beyond any doubt that this view is indeed correct. One could certainly argue that there are reasonable arguments that would seem to agree with Wilson's approach —as a matter of fact, that's what he spends most of the book doing, offering those very arguments—, but they are short of definite and beyond any doubt. Ironically enough, then, those who fall for the Ionian Enchantment cannot explain reasonably well why they believe in this underlying unity of reality.

jueves, 4 de septiembre de 2008

Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge

The idea of consilience itself is a concept of Greek origin that assumes an intrinsic orderliness in our cosmos, which makes it understandable by human reason. As such it is the prerequisite of any scientific knowledge of our surroundings, since there cannot be knowledge —at least in a form that we can communicate and share with others— without the use of reason. In this book E. O. Wilson calls for a return to this old project that attempted to unite all of human knowledge into a single corpus —not so different from the efforts to find a theory of everything that we have heard of so much lately, although extending far beyond the realm of physics and reaching towards many other disciplines, including the social sciences. Along the way, Wilson takes us on a fascinating journey through the different attempts to build this synthesis in human history and reflects over our contemporary state.

Technical description:
Title: Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge.
Author: Edrwad O. Wilson.
Publisher: Alfred A. Knopf
Edition: First Edition, New York (USA), 1998.
Pages: 332 pages, including index.
ISBN: 0-679-45077-7

Entry from Wikipedia.
Find it on Amazon (US, UK).